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What this paper argues - author's comments
The following is the text of the Sir Richard Kirby
Lecture which I gave at the University of Wollongong
on 16 October 1989, entitled "Industrial Relations in
1989: is a new province of law and order achievable?".
In it I have argued that a new province of law and
order is not only achievable, but is indeed taking shape
under a system of conciliation and arbitration, as
opposed to an enterprise based system of collective
bargaining.
Since writing the paper I have read the article by
McDonald and Rimmer, "Award Restructuring and
Wages Policy" (GROWTH 37: "Wage Determination in
Australia". Published by CEDA September 1989). In
their article the authors use the term, "managed
decentralism", to describe the shift which has taken
place in wages policy since 1986.
The authors attribute two broad objectives to
managed decentralism: "macro-economic wage
restraint and improved micro economic efficiency
(mainly higher labour productivity)".
If I had read the McDonald and Rimmer article
before delivering the Kirby Lecture I would have sought
the authors' permission to use the term "managed
decentralism" in my title, because the term captures
perfectly MTIA's strategy for reforming the labour
market in the metal and engineering industry.
In fact, my paper specifically addresses the two
objectives of "managed decentralism"
On the first objective - micro-economic reform I have argued that:
. . in the past three years in particular, the
(conciliation and arbitration) system has
demonstrated a remarkable adaptability in meeting
the nation's need for wholesale labour market reform
through a program of award restructuring.
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As far as MTIA is concerned, our whole strategy for
achieving an internationally competitive industry
rests upon acceptance, at the enterprise level, of the
concept of mutuality of interests between management
and employees in place of conflict. Fostering this
mutuality of interests has been MTIA's key objective
since 1986.
MTIA's approach and that adopted by the Industrial
Relations Commission in its Structural Efficiency
Principle have been to commence the process of refonn
at the industry level by removing the institutionalised
roadblocks represented by an outmoded award
structure and inadequate training systems, and to put
into place a new framework which will encourage and
facilitate change at the enterprise level. As employers
are now beginning to understand, faced with the task
of having to introduce a completely new job
classification structure, the major responsibility for
implementing the reform program will fall on them.
MTIA sees that its role, in co-operation with the
trade unions, is to create the environment in which
enterprises can reasonably expect to achieve the
changes they need".
Since I delivered the Lecture in mid-October 1989,
MTIA has put to the metal trades unions a proposal entirely consistent with the idea of "managed
decentralism" - to incorporate a provision in the Metal
Industry Award to enable employers and employees to
negotiate "Enterprise Flexibility Agreements" the terms
of which shall be in substitution for the provisions of
the Award. The unions are yet to respond to the
proposal but early signs are encouraging for further
progress in this micro-economic reform.
The second objective of managed decentralism is,
as I have pointed out, macro-economic wage restraint.
II

My paper draws attention to the fact that ", . . labour
costs have been contained to a remarkable degree in the
face of strong demand for labour which saw 380,000
jobs created in the last year". The point is made that
there has been a substantial redistribution of national
income from wages to profits, helping to fund a
sustained surge in business investment.
It is crucial that wage restraint be maintained.
As I argue in the paper:
"We have had to find a wages system which offers a
balanced approach to the competing needs of
considering the macro-wages outcome and the need to
maintain the momentum of labour market reform over
the next two to three critical years.
I believe we need to retain a centralised approach to set
a ceiling on wage increases, but to provide the
opportunity to industries or enterprises to negotiate
wage increases to the maximum amount available
with the objective of improving the productivity and
efficiency of the enterprise. I think the emphasis,
however, should be on the enterprise. More likely
there could be room for a combination of both."
Deregulation of the labour market is perhaps the
most prominent issue on the economic agenda at
present and there is unquestionably a need for
business to understand the implications of the various
options being proposed. This is not an easy task, given
the range of views being put forward on a daily basis by
economic commentators, editorial writers, politicians,
employer spokesmen, trade union leaders, and others.
The paper is offered as a contribution to the public
debate.
A C Evans, Sydney 17 November 1989.
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Text of the lecture
The basis of the Australian system

Given the subject matter and the distinguished
Australian whom this lecture honours, it is fitting that
I should commence with a statement by Sir Richard
Kirby written 25 years ago in his capacity as President
of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration

"Australians have long prided themselves
on the value of the arbitration system with
the disciplines it imposes, particularly that
imposed by the requirement that the parties
put their cases to the test of open argument
in public hearing. This has been a striking
contrast which our system presents, to the
method of collective bargaining practised
overseas. It would be a sorry concept of 'a
new province of law and order' if now the
handling of problems . . . were to lead to the
chaos of the jungle. The issue goes beyond
the interest of one side or other seeking to get
the most out of a situation for individual
advantage - it goes right to the heart of the
nation's interest".

IV

As every student of industrial relations knows,
it was a predecessor of Sir Richard, His Honour
Mr Justice Higgins who coined that familiar phrase,
"a new province of law and order" to describe the
industrial relations system of conciliation and
arbitration then being inaugurated. Justice Higgins
summed up the objective of the new system in these
words:
"The process of conciliation, with arbitration in the
background, is substituted for the rude and barbarous
process of strike and lock-out. Reason is to displace
force; the might of the State is to enforce peace
between industrial combatants, as well as between
other combatants; and all in the interests of the
public".

The system in operation
If we are to imply from Justice Higgins, remarks
that strikes were to be eliminated, then it has to be said
that the new province of law and order has been
seldom, if ever, achieved. The fact is that Australia has
had strikes by unions to a greater or a lesser extent, in
practically every year since that much quoted phrase
was first used.
This is despite numerous legislative changes to the
Conciliation and Arbitration Act (now the Industrial
Relations Act) designed to make the system more
effective.
What the record has shown is that you cannot
legislate to prevent entirely all the emotional, social and
economic factors which lie behind industrial
disputation, from erupting.
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But they are much less likely to erupt if the nation's
industrial culture has been developed to full, positive
maturity.
No one appreciated this more than His Honour Sir
Richard Kirby who said in his annual report of 1971:
"I feel it my duty to report my strong opinion, based
on my experience as a Judge of the old Court and as
President of this Commission for its first 15 years,
that in the long term a reduction in strikes can only
be brought about by an improvement in industrial
relationships, and that this is far more likely to arise
from changed attitudes of the organised employers on
the one hand and the organised trade union
movement on the other hand than from mere changes
in Acts of parliament. . .".
The two statements by Sir Richard Kirby that I have
quoted form the basis of my lecture. What I shall argue
is that a new province of law and order is achievable,
indeed has been achieved under a system of
conciliation and arbitration as opposed to a system of
collective bargaining, and that the single most
important factor in bringing this about in Australia's
largest manufacturing sector - the metal and
engineering industry - has been the "changed attitudes
of organised employers and the organised trade union
movement".

The confrontation years
We do well, when we wish to assess the present
and the future, to look at the past. Certainly in the
metal and engineering industry, industrial behaviour
during the Sixties and early Seventies fully warranted
the concern which His Honour expressed.
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In 1963, for example, MTIA or MTEA as it then was,
handled the greatest number of strikes and disputes
(209) in its 90-year history, clear evidence that the "rude
and barbarous process" of strikes had not been
displaced. There were:
□ strikes to force re-employment of retrenched
employees;
□ strikes for wage increases;
□ strikes to force weekly hiring of casuals; besides a
host of demarcation disputes, overtime bans and
other industrial problems.
The pattern from year to year was broadly the
same, with unions achieving wage increases by
arbitration before the Commission and then using
direct action in individual factories to force overaward
payments which inevitably flowed across the whole
industry.
These strikes entailed the loss of 30 or 40 thousand
man-days for the metal industry in any one year in
New South Wales alone. They persisted despite a bans
clause in the award and access by employers to penal
sanctions.
A noticeable feature, as one goes back to records of
the mid-Sixties, was the number of strikes which
occurred either immediately before or during National
Wage Cases. These strikes were not as a result of
specific grievances, but were part of concerted union
campaigns in an attempt to pressurise the Commission
into meeting the unions' demands. The campaigns
continued, even though the Commission repeatedly
stated it was not swayed by them. The campaigns were
clear manifestations that many trade unions were not
prepared to accept the proper processes of obtaining
wage increases.
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And while they may not have influenced the
Commission's decisions, they did have the effect of
gaining publicity for the unions among their
constituents and building up an expectation for
increases to be gained either within the system or
outside it.

Confrontation becomes entrenched
During this period, MTIA was constantly reiterating
the need for arbitration authorities to put beyond
question any suggestion that claims backed by strikes
could be sanctioned within the system.
One MTIA annual report (1967) pointed out that
" . . . too often encouragement is given to such a dual
system and too infrequently is it made clear that the
Conciliation and Arbitration Act has as a chief object
the avoidance of disputes and strikes".
In 1967-68, in the NSW metal industry, there were
324 strikes following the Work Value decision as well as
another 247 other strikes which could be described as
the normal yearly quota.
The way in which the "score" of strikes was
highlighted each year in MTIA reports is itself a
revealing commentary on how the strike mentality and
the determination to combat it had become entrenched
in the industrial culture of those times:
"During the year (1969) MTEA handled a total of
368 strikes and disputes in New South Wales on
behalf of its members . . . this is the greatest number
handled by the Association in any one year (excluding
the 1967-68 Work Value strikes)".
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Thus, year after year a culture of adversarial
hostility developed, a far cry indeed from the "new
province of law and order" espoused so eloquently by
Higgins J so many years before.
The more buoyant the economy, with high
employment, full order books and shortages of skilled
workers, the more the unions bypassed the system to
achieve their aims by attacking employers on a factory
by factory basis. Thus the industrial stability in the
metal industry which we are experiencing in 1989 flies
in the face of history, and I shall have more to say about
that later.

Glimmerings of reason
In the long journey towards a new province of law
and order, there have been attempts to find a smoother
road. For example, in 1971 MTIA made a conscious
decision to open a dialogue with the metal trades
unions and explore the possibility of avoiding the
disruption which had become endemic in the industry.
Metal industry employers were anxious to deal with
the claims on an orderly basis at a national level
through the processes of conciliation and arbitration
rather than accompanied by strike action. Our other
objectives at that time were:
□ to ensure that any increases in the general level of
wages in the industry resulted from award changes
rather than by individual employers being obliged to
make concessions under duress and thereby
widening the gap between award wages and actual
wages;
□ to take all possible steps to ensure that the industrial
chaos which occurred in the metal industry
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following the Work Value Case in 1967 did not occur
again;
□ to strengthen the role of the Conciliation and
Arbitration system in industrial relations and
thereby discount claims that it is ineffective and
should be replaced by a system of collective
bargaining;
□ to establish sound personal relationships with
union officials so that employer and union
representatives could work together to improve
industrial relations in the industry.
The result was that claims made by the metal trades
unions in 1971 were settled peaceably before
Mr Commissioner Hood through a "collective
conciliation" process instead of being fought out in the
factories. Parts of the final outcome which related to
changes in conditions of employment were
substantially agreed upon by the partie's; other matters
relating to wages were arbitrated expeditiously.
But because many people had forgotten that the Act
which governed industrial relations gave the parties
access to conciliation as well as to arbitration, there was
a public controversy over the outcome. We were
accused of undermining the system by entering into
collective bargaining arrangements. This was, of course,
far from the truth.
What both parties were coming to realise, after
many years of confrontation, was that fighting
industrial issues by direct action did not provide for
orderly relationships between management and
employees. Confrontation resulted in lost production,
lost wages, inflationary wage settlements made beyond
economic capacity and poor workshop relationships.
On the other hand, best results were not achieved if
every industrial issue was immediately referred to
6

formal arbitration by a third party. Some decisions
flowing from this procedure had proved to be
calamitous for industrial relations in the metal trades
industry - the 1967 Metal Trades Work Value decision
was an example.

The development of conciliation
MTIA decided to tread a new path between these
two extremes, the overall objective being to ensure that
the claims made for improved wages and conditions in
the industry were dealt with orderly and uniformly
throughout the industry, but still within the framework
of the conciliation and arbitration system.
The emphasis had swung to a fundamental part of
the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act
which read:
". . . the chief objects of this Act are (a) to promote
goodwill in industry, (b) to encourage conciliation
with a view to amicable agreement, thereby
preventing and settling industrial disputes . .
Previously the metal industry had become
universally acknowledged as the industry where great
industrial issues were fought out by direct action.
Industrial relations suffered severely from the "hard
line" approach of both sides, who knew that one small
gain would soon be reflected throughout the entire
Australian workforce. In other words, the conciliation
processes of the Act were not being availed of in the
metal industry, although conciliation hadlong been a
common practice in several other important industries
over many years.
Following the success of the Hood conciliation,
claims made by the metal trades unions in May 1972
were therefore dealt with rather differently from the
7

past, and from the beginning all avenues available
under the Act were fully explored.
The unions' claims, which previously would have
become a national strike issue, were discussed within
the official conciliation and arbitration system. Instead
of issues being fought factory by factory with shop
stewards versus management, professional officers of
MTIA and the unions hammered out the fundamental
claims, aided by orderly procedures under the
jurisdiction of a Deputy President of the Commission,
Mr Justice Williams.
During these procedures the unions used their best
endeavours to ensure that work continued, thus
avoiding wide scale stoppages which usually occurred
when union claims were at issue.
The achievement of stability in wage levels and
employment conditions for a defined period had been
an important consideration during the proceedings.
Twelve months' stability was achieved after the Hood
award and continued after the 1972 decision.

Common goals defined
An encouraging development at that time unprecedented, in fact - was the defining by MTIA and
the unions of common goals, namely:
"that in the interest of preserving and developing the
Australian metal trades industry the parties should
use their best endeavours to ensure that adequate
recognition is given to the fact that the industry is
Australia's largest manufacturing industry, that it
provides employment of many thousands of
Australian men and women; and, that for their part
the Unions and employers will continue to co-operate
in ensuring that the industry remains efficient and a
vital part of the national economy".
8

While stability reigned in the metal industry at this
time, other industries experienced the full impact of
confrontation by other unions: power supplies were cut
in NSW, airports had to close, mail was tied up, trains
were stopped, and building projects had to be
abandoned.
Meanwhile, in the metal industry company
executives were sitting down with union officials and
shop stewards from across the industry at various
seminars to hear other points of view, and to make
their own contributions from the floor.
As I have said, these developments were
encouraging but were not sufficient to overcome the
pressures brought about by a buoyant economy and
high inflation. In the boom period of 1974 the metal
trades unions were actively pursuing three alternative
methods of gaining increases, namely the industry
review, national wage claims and overaward claims on
individual employers. Thus, a three tiered wage system
was in operation. Seven days of national stoppages
occurred during industry negotiations in that year.
When in 1975 the Commission in its National Wage
decision introduced wage indexation, MTIA saw the
decision as a highly significant and constructive
attempt to halt the inflationary spiral by allowing wage
increases only within the ambit of the conditions laid
down. MTIA members saw wage indexation as holding
out some hope - a forlorn hope, as it eventually turned
out - of achieving stability and predictability in relation
to their escalating wage costs, and certainly preferable
to the industrial turmoil which had become the norm.
When wage indexation was abandoned by the
Commission because of lack of support from the
parties, history repeated itself with a return to factory
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by factory chaos, culminating in the damaging 35-hour
week campaign in 1980-81.
Summing up the events of this whole period,
it must be said that despite sporadic headway made
during the Seventies, we still had a long way to go
before we could build upon the mutuality of interests
which exists between management and the workforce.

Towards a productive industrial culture
In this regard, I should explain more fully what we
were trying to achieve in our endeavours to open up a
dialogue with the unions.
We are indebted to another farsighted Australian,
Senator John Button, for a definition of the kind of
"industrial culture" earlier foreshadowed by
Sir Richard Kirby.
Senator Button described industrial culture as
"the unofficial, unwritten background against which
decisions are made, and which, to a large extent,
determines the decisions you can effectively make".
The important words are "decisions you can
effectively make".
If the industrial culture is not conducive to a
decision which has been made, whether it is one made
by government, an industrial tribunal or a company,
then the chance of it achieving community acceptance
and of putting it into effect will not be very good.
A positive industrial culture is one in which
employees and unions are at least reasonably satisfied
with their working conditions, employers are able to
operate profitably, and both are aware of the mutuality
of interests which binds them.
A negative industrial culture is one marked by a
dissatisfied and belligerent workforce and by employers
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who are more interested in exploiting workers for short
term gain rather than in a longer term, mutually
rewarding relationship.
It seems to me that an industrial culture consists of
two main elements. One is concerned with attitudes:
□ the way people think about work, its satisfactions,
and its rewards;
□ how they view the employer-employee relationship
- whether with hostility, with affability, or
somewhere in between;
□ what they perceive the role of business to be - as
exploiters or as partners in community wealth
creation;
□ how they see the role of trade unions - as bully boys
or responsible representatives of workers with a
legitimate role;
□ how they see Australia fitting into the rest of the
world - appreciating that world developments
intimately affect our national economy, or
alternatively, adopting an isolationist, head-in-thesand attitude.
These factors are involved in the first element of
industrial culture - that which deals with attitudes.

Alternative industrial structures
The second element is not attitudinal, but
structural. It is the organisational and procedural
framework within which attitudes have been allowed
to develop, and which provides the mechanism for
dealing with issues that have to be resolved.
At one extreme, this framework may be a
deregulated collective bargaining system:
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□ in which the parties pit their strengths against each
other - we have witnessed this in the domestic
pilots' dispute;
□ a bargaining system in which the market is the final
arbiter;
□ with no account being taken of the public interest.
This is one of the possible outcomes so clearly
described by Sir Richard Kirby 25 years ago, which I
quoted at the beginning of my paper.
At the other end of the scale of possibilities is a
rigid, compulsory arbitration system:
□ with no responsibility on the parties to work out
solutions;
□ one in which industrial issues are decided arbitrarily
by a third party.
We know now that the ideal system must be
somewhere between one of complete deregulation and
rigid control. But in our search for a new province of
law and order, should it lie more within the framework
of a collective bargaining system or a system of
compulsory conciliation and arbitration? I will deal
with that question now.

Collective bargaining and
compulsory conciliation and arbitration the fundamental difference
There are those who argue that the system of
conciliation and arbitration is not serving Australia well
and that its abandonment should be a national priority.
Then there are those who, while they believe
conciliation and arbitration has outlived its usefulness,
take a more pragmatic view and favour a gradual
dismantling of the system in favour of a collective
12

bargaining system which focuses on the enterprise. In
other words, the responsibility for setting wage levels,
conditions of employment and managing labour
relations would devolve entirely to the enterprise.
An enterprise based system of collective bargaining
is fundamentally different from a compulsory
conciliation and arbitration system as we know it, and it
is important to state this fundamental difference at the
outset. The Australian conciliation and arbitration
system is based on the public interest being paramount
as, you will recall, Sir Richard Kirby reminded us from
time to time; but in collective bargaining systems,
where no agreement or contract is in operation
between the parties, there exists the legal and moral
right to strike or lock-out, without any consideration of
the public interest.
This means that when a government and a society
accepts collective bargaining, they also accept that
serious and very long strikes and lock-outs, highly
disruptive at times to the economy of the country, may
occur without access to any outside body to terminate
the strike or lock-out. Shortly stated, collective
bargaining is a free and voluntary process by which
employers and employees in many countries negotiate
between themselves to establish terms and conditions
of employment suitable to that enterprise or industry
without any regard to the effects it may have on the
national economy, and hence on the public interest.
The advantage in such a system is that both parties,
realising this, are required to face up to the issues
squarely and accept the responsibility for achieving the
objective which serves their own interests.
Conciliation, on the other hand, is a process by
which employers and employees in Australia negotiate
between themselves in an endeavour to establish terms
and conditions of employment which will be ratified by
13

tribunals unless opposed to the public interest.
The founders of the Australian system provided for
independent tribunals to determine what is right and
fair between the parties, a procedure supported by laws
to prevent the occurrence of long strikes (or lock-outs)
in breach of an award - a procedure backed up at that
time by effective laws; it is a matter of regret that
effective sanctions no longer exist within the industrial
relations system. It is imperative that this be redressed.
In the event that no agreement is reached, both
parties are required by law to submit to compulsory
arbitration and to observe the decision which is based
on the public interest being paramount, the
Commission being required by law to have regard to
the economic consequences of its decision.

Collective bargaining in operation
Now, it has to be said as a matter of historical fact
that during the period of the Sixties, Seventies and
early Eighties, in the absence of effective sanctions and
lack of commitment by the parties, the operation of the
conciliation and arbitration system left much to be
desired.
On the other hand, we have to ask ourselves
whether under a system of collective bargaining this
earlier turbulent period would have been any different.
Frankly, I think not, because the irony is that the
period 1968-1982, except for the operation of centralised
wage fixing, reflected more of a collective bargaining
system than a system of compulsory conciliation and
arbitration.
As I have already argued, one of the central tenets
of a system of collective bargaining is acceptance of the
legal and moral right to strike. This has been recognised
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in the Niland Green Paper, "Transforming Industrial
Relations in New South Wales", which recommends
that the industrial relations system be radically changed
by encouraging enterprise based collective bargaining,
with strike action being legitimate during the
bargaining process.
In the Sixties, Seventies and early Eighties, while
strike action was not "legitimate", unions nevertheless
struck with impunity. In damaging factory by factory
disputation, wages and conditions settlement of a
diverse nature were demanded of employers. Different
settlements at various enterprises created anomalies
and inequities in the minds of employees. Employees
in a particular factory would become discontented
when they learned of more favourable wages and
conditions of employment being granted in other
workplaces nearby. This discontent, exploited by the
unions, caused further disputation.
A classic example of collective bargaining, causing
dissatisfaction, further disputation and a costly
outcome for Australia occurred in 1970 in the oil
industry and the ACI Engineering Company.
During the bargaining process the oil companies
offered four weeks annual leave. In the same time
frame during bargaining over a new agreement, the
ACI Engineering Company conceded a 17V2% loading
on three weeks annual leave.
Employers across the country were individually and
collectively pursued by the unions to grant to
employees both of these highly costly conditions of
employment.
As you are no doubt aware, the four weeks annual
leave and the 17 V2% annual leave loading ultimately
flowed on to all employees in Australia.
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It has to be said that these concessions occurred as
a result of consent agreements and not as a result of
arbitrated decisions of industrial tribunals. Indeed,
when the metal industry as a whole was presented
with these demands, we found ourselves surrounded
by concessions in other industries, so that there was no
other course reasonably and sensibly open to us but to
agree to vary the award by consent.
Before this occurred MTIA members had, through a
series of secret ballots, expressed the view that they
were not prepared to shut down their factories over
claims which had been widely conceded and which
had virtually become national standards.

Support for introducing collective
bargaining at the enterprise level
The lessons of the past are not always applied to
determine the future.
As I have already indicated, there is a body of
opinion that the current system of regulating industrial
relations in Australia should be replaced by a
deregulated enterprise based system of bargaining
directly between employers and employees. This
opinion has increasingly manifested itself in the form of
policy statements, Green Papers and, indeed,
legislative form in Queensland.
The impetus given to the debate over what type of
industrial relations system would best serve Australian
future needs is probably a by-product of the wider
economic debate. Undoubtedly though, it has been
thrown into sharper focus by the operation of the
centralised wage fixing system which is an integral
feature of the formal system of conciliation and
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arbitration - indeed, in the context of the current
debate, synonymous with it.
It is both necessary and useful to consider some of
the policies supporting a deregulated approach.
The Liberal Party's industrial relations policy
focuses squarely on the enterprise and productivity
related wage rises.
In Queensland, the Industrial Conciliation and
Arbitration Act provides for Voluntary Employment
Agreements (VEA). The basic thrust of VEAs is to
encourage enterprise-based agreements which, subject
to meeting certain minimum standards, enables an
employer and employees to negotiate wages and
working conditions outside the formal system of
conciliation and arbitration. I understand, though, that
the incidence of VEAs is not high.
In New South Wales the State Government has in
general terms embraced the recommendations of the
Niland Green Paper I referred to earlier. It is expected
that many of the Niland recommendations will pass
into law later this year, including those initiatives aimed
at encouraging a shift in the focus of industrial relations
activity to the enterprise. For example, the Green paper
recommends that:
1. Procedures be established for the formation and
recognition of enterprise focused bargaining units
and for the development of enterprise focused
awards and agreements;
2. The option of establishing an enterprise-wide trade
union where more than 200 employees vote for such
a proposal;
3. The rationalisation of existing trade union structures
which facilitate the formation of enterprise focused
and/or industry based unions.
17

As mentioned earlier, the Green Paper also
recommends the introduction of the concept of
distinguishing between interest disputes and rights
disputes. The former relate to the making of terms of
employment, the latter relate to the interpretation of the
rights of the parties to an agreement. This entails
accepting the legitimacy of the right to strike in respect
of interest disputes (that is, where there is no
agreement between the parties or the agreement has
expired) but casting strikes in respect of rights as
unlawful and therefore open to action by affected
parties (that is, where one side or the other breaches
the terms of the agreement).*
The Green Paper makes this clear when it says
(p66):
"As discussed elsewhere (Sections 2.8 and 2.9),
strikes (and bans) as a general rule should be accepted
as legitimate and lawful in the first phase, but they
would not be legitimate in the second phase".
Indeed, as we have seen, this is a fundamental
aspect of a free collective bargaining system, namely the
legal and moral right to strike and lockout where no
contract is in existence between the parties.
I simply pose the question: how many employers
will want to embrace enterprise bargaining on this
basis?
In the federal arena of labour relations, the
Industrial Relations Act, 1988 which commenced to
operate in March this year makes provision for the
certification of agreements under Section 115.
This section of the Act sanctions decentralised
bargaining to the extent that:
1.

An agreement must be in the public interest but it
will not necessarily be contrary to the public interest

merely because it is inconsistent with National Wage
Case wage fixing principles;
1. An agreement automatically lapses when its term of
operation expires;
3. An agreement will not be able to be varied during
its life except in special and compelling
circumstances;
4. In the event of industrial action a party may be
permitted to treat the agreement as terminated.
However, it is important to note that in its May 1989
decision, a Full Bench in the National Wage Case ruled
that before certifying an agreement pursuant to S. 115
the Commission must be satisfied that the agreement is
not a device to circumvent the general wage fixation
principles and thus threaten the orderly operation of
the industrial relations system. S. 115 and the Australian
Industrial Relations Commission's approach to it
signals a far more cautious approach to enterprise
bargaining than in the case with VEAs or the New
South Wales Green Paper.

Viability of a deregulated system
of enterprise by enterprise
collective bargaining
Having canvassed the heightened interest in a
deregulated system of enterprise bargaining, I have to
consider whether in contemporary Australia, it is a
viable alternative.
There are several key factors which mitigate against
appropriate outcomes through a factory by factory
collective bargaining system. The first of these is the
concept of comparative wage justice, a deeply

*The NSW Govt, has since announced it does not intend to embrace this aspect.
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entrenched belief held by the Australian workforce
which guarantees that new standards of wages and/or
conditions conceded in one enterprise or one industry
flow to employees in other industries.
Even though we may fervently wish that this
entrenched view would disappear, we are dealing with
industrial reality - the concept of comparative wage
justice is the most fundamental reality of industrial life
and it will not disappear. Under a system of enterprise
by enterprise bargaining, increases in wages and
salaries granted in one enterprise or sector quickly flow
through to other sectors of the economy. This can be
particularly damaging when sectors of the economy not
subject to international competitive pressure to hold
prices down, easily concede to excessive union
demands.
A second factor linked to the first is the
comparatively small industrial/services base in
Australia, a large proportion of it being concentrated
along the eastern seaboard. This factor, combined with
the strongly held "comparative wage justice" principle,
creates a very fast transfer of improved wages and
conditions of employment in one enterprise or industry
to all sectors of the economy. In countries like USA
where collective bargaining operates, the huge
industrial/services sector spread throughout the
country make this flow on of improvements far more
difficult.
The third key factor is the structure and power of
the trade union movement in Australia, particularly
among blue collar workers. We have witnessed in the
metal and engineering and other industries on many,
many occasions the devastation which a national union
or unions can cause when they decide to press
demands on one company.

20

An individual enterprise in the bargaining process
as envisaged by Professor Niland, in the face of strong
national unions, is in a very weak bargaining position
in view of the fact that unions would know they were
legally and morally entitled to go on strike at the time
of the bargaining process. Such an enterprise, in our
experience, will sooner or later accede to the demands
of the unions. If it does otherwise, the individual
enterprise will lose market share and eventually go out
of business. A simple illustration is the case where two
or three market leaders dominate. One is attacked with
strike action, and the other one or two take the market
share, which is afterwards not recovered.
In a system based on collective bargaining at the
enterprise level, with strike action legalised and no
recourse to the law, the concessions forced on one
individual enterprise will very quickly flow to other
enterprises. As indicated earlier, enterprises operating
in industries not faced with international competition
and able to pass on concessions to their customers, will
more quickly concede large wage increases to satisfy
the demands of the trade union.
Another factor which cannot be dismissed is that a
great number of companies have long term contracts,
some as long as 20 years, where cost recovery occurs
only if legally binding variations are made by the
Industrial Relations Commission to the Metal Industry
Award. In these cases, overaward payments or
enterprise agreements would not qualify for
recoupment and the companies concerned would face
massive economic losses. I know of no other country in
the world where such a rigid system of rise and fall
clauses exists. Whether this is a good or bad thing is
not the issue. It is the reality.
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A deregulated system
and its implications for wage fixing
If the suggestion is that a system of enterprise based
bargaining should be instituted as the exclusive system
of wage fixing to take Australia into the next decade,
then despite its inherent virtues I am not convinced
that it is a viable, realistic proposition.
As the Australian Commission said in its August
1989 National Wage decision:
"Ultimately the test is not the pursuit of what is
perfect in the abstract, but what is the best outcome
which is workable and sustainable immediately and
over the medium and longer term".
Does a system based exclusively on enterprise
bargaining meet this test, you may ask.
You may also ask how the macro economic
outcomes can be controlled if there are no constraints
on the settlements as a result of the free bargaining
process. Indeed, it is inevitable that in many cases
industrial pressure will be applied to maximise the
settlements.
A number of other factors have to be considered.
The first is that wages policy is essentially set in the
federal arena. The Labor Government, through its
Prices and Incomes Accord with the ACTU, has a
dominant influence over wages policy. There is no sign
that the Government intends to even countenance a
deregulated wages system which focuses on enterprise
bargaining.
Secondly, it could be argued that the States could
bypass federal dominance over wages policy by
ignoring the established convention of adopting
National Wage fixing principles and set their own
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independent wages policy. For example, in Queensland
VEAs could be the vehicle. The difficulty with this
proposition is that in Australia we have a federal system
for regulating industrial relations. Trade union power
and influence essentially resides in federal unions and
their peak council, the ACTU. Therefore, any move
towards an isolationist wages policy would prove
difficult because an individual enterprise is in a very
weak bargaining position when confronted by large
unions whose power base is national and who would
have learned a few strategic lessons from the SEQEB
dispute.
Moreover, any attempt to increase the effectiveness
of penalties and sanctions against the excesses of trade
unions would prove less than useful if those unions
were able to retreat into the federal jurisdiction by, for
example, serving logs of claims on individual
enterprises for the purpose of bringing them under
federal awards.
The third factor: it could be argued that with a
federal election in prospect, a change of government
would bring with it a change in wages policy. And
given the Coalition's policy on wages, the focus would
be on enterprise bargaining. However, as I understand
it, the Coalition's policy does not necessarily mean
abandonment of the existing system of conciliation and
arbitration, involving as it does registered organisations
of employees and an independent body, namely, the
Australian Industrial Relations Commission, that
administers the laws relating to industrial relations.
While a Coalition Federal Government might follow
the Queensland and New South Wales examples of
setting up a system of enterprise based bargaining in
competition with the established system of industrial
regulation, with the objective that in time the former
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will replace the latter as the preferred system, it would
remain the case for some years that the existing system
would continue to operate. Furthermore, I expect that
the ACTU would still be entitled to make national wage
claims and the Commission would still be entitled to
hear and determine those claims in an independent
manner.
In doing so, I would be surprised, given the
obvious course which the Commission has set in terms
of a centralised approach to wage fixing, that it would
do an about face within the next two years and while
progress was still being made under its Structural
Efficiency Principle, by adopting a system of enterprise
bargaining. The Commission has already heard very
powerful arguments in support of an enterprise
approach in the last two wage cases and has rejected
them.
One thing is perfectly clear : those who own and/or
manage companies in the metal and engineering
industry have demonstrated time and time again that
they are not prepared to risk factory by factory
bargaining with national unions. Throughout the
Eighties, MTIA members have voted almost
unanimously, in secret ballots, for industry settlements
when these options have been put to them. For
example, in June 1988, having had an extensive briefing
on the metal unions wage claims, members were asked
to vote on one of five options. Rather than risk the
prospect of a wages breakout, the meeting voted
overwhelmingly in favour of an option which
authorised MTIA to take all reasonable steps to resolve
the claims on terms acceptable to the Commonwealth
Government and the Arbitration Commission.
In February 1989, a similar ballot was held with
unanimous support for MTIA to resolve the claims on
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an industry basis thereby avoiding a damaging factory
by factory overaward payment campaign. The options
put to members in June 1988 and February 1989 are set
out in the Appendices.

Benefits from centralised system
I now want to consider what has been achieved
under a system of conciliation and arbitration of which
centralised wage fixing is currently an integral feature.
Firstly, labour costs have been contained to a
remarkable degree in the face of strong demand for
labour which saw 380,000 jobs created in the last year.
This point was made in the Australian Financial Review
(Michael Stutchbury 13/9/89), and I quote:
"The bottom line is that Kelty and Keating have kept
the lid on wage inflation during what has been
Australia's biggest economic boom since at least the
early 1970s. Under the Wages Accord, the ACTU has
deliberately facilitated the biggest redistribution of
national income from wages to profits for at least a
generation.
"This fact seems to be conveniently forgotten by those
who are now squawking for an abandonment of any
centralised rein on aggregate labour costs. By
correcting what in the 1970s was seen by these same
people as the Australian economy's fundamental
imbalance (the so-called real wage overhang), the
Accord has underwritten the corporate profit boom
which in turn is funding the current surge in
business investment".
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Per cent

Source: Budget Papers, 1989.

Factor Shares (a)

Under the two-tier system in 1987-88 and the
subsequent structural efficiency principle, the
centralised system has accelerated the contribution that
parties to awards could make to improve Australia's
economic performance, by giving priority to labour
market reform.
It also provided a stable industrial relations
environment in relation to wage fixing. There would
undeniably have been a wages breakout in December
1988 in the metal industry if the structural efficiency
principle had not determined an agenda for
discussions in August 1988 relating to award
restructuring.this with the full support and
participation by organisations such as MTIA.

26

At that time, in the face of severe labour shortages,
MTIA advised its members not to increase overaward
payments for fear that this would snowball and
develop into a wages free-for-all with serious economic
consequences.
The trade unions also showed remarkable restraint
because they knew that if there were a wages explosion
it would spell the end of any reform program through
award restructuring.
The critics of centralised wage fixing argue that a
decentralised approach governed essentially by market
forces would have achieved a better wages outcome.
But would it? Certainly not in the metal and
engineering industry for the reason I have already
explained and I dare say it would not have in building,
transport, airlines, and some other key industry
sectors. This is because you cannot ignore those other
market forces which, in the absence of the constraints
imposed by a centralised wage fixing system, would
have operated to increase substantially the pressure on
wages, namely, severe labour shortages, high interest
rates and the cuts in real wages which have occurred
over the past six years.

Adaptability of the
conciliation and arbitration system
I believe MTIA's position in the debate over which
system is to be preferred - collective bargaining or
conciliation and arbitration - can be summed up as
follows:
The Australian Constitution has provided us with a
conciliation and arbitration system which has shown
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remarkable flexibility and ability to adapt to changing
social and economic imperatives, while at the same
time affording at least some protection to those within
its jurisdiction and, not least, to the public interest. In
the turbulent years after World War II, parties to the
system failed to take advantage of the system's
potential; failed to broaden its scope, preferring to
operate within the narrow parameters of arbitration.
But in the past three years in particular, the system has
demonstrated a remarkable adaptability in meeting the
nation's need for wholesale labour market reform
through a program of award restructuring.
As far as MTIA is concerned, our whole strategy for
achieving an internationally competitive industry rests
upon acceptance, at the enterprise level, of the concept
of mutuality of interests between management and
employees in place of conflict. Fostering this mutuality
of interests has been MTIA's key objective since 1986.
MTIA's approach and that adopted by the Industrial
Relations Commission in its Structural Efficiency
Principle has been to commence the process of reform
at the industry level by removing the institutionalised
roadblocks represented by an outmoded award
structure and inadequate traininq systems, and to put
into place a new framework which will encourage and
facilitate change at the enterprise level. As employers
are now beginning to understand;faced with the task of
having to introduce a completely new job classification
structure, the major responsibility for implementing
the reform program will fall to them. MTIA sees that its
role, in cooperation with the trade unions, is to create
the environment in which enterprises can reasonably
expect to achieve the changes they need.
In our most recent industry negotiations with the
metal unions, where the wage requirements were set
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by the Industrial Relations Commission, we have
emphasised the importance of discussions at the plant
level. In particular, MTIA is pressing the unions to
agree to award variations which would allow
management and its employees by agreement to
change hours of work, meal breaks, annual leave
breaks etc. In addition, we are seeking agreement on
relaxation of demarcation lines, new training
procedures and many other things, all of which must
be implemented by discussion at the enterprise level.
We are, therefore, clearly supportive of negotiations at
the enterprise level designed to increase productivity.
Indeed, we believe this to be essential. What we are
opposed to is the introduction of a system that would
encourage an industrial free-for-all which would have
no regard for the public interest. Such an industrial
free-for-all would crucify our companies and in the
current environment result in a massive wages
break-out.
It is MTIA's assessment that in the last three years,
while many of the achievements are not yet highly
visible, the basic building blocks of labour market
reform are now being put into final position and we
expect the benefits will begin to be realised in 1990/91.
This extraordinary degree of change is occurring
under the existing conciliation and arbitration system
and within a timeframe which I do not consider would
be achievable under a fragmented, uncoordinated
system of collective bargaining.
We have witnessed the parameters of our system of
conciliation and arbitration being pushed out to an
unprecedented extent in recent years. But I do not
believe we have yet reached the boundaries of our
system's full potential - the system can no doubt be
eased out further. But it is an evolutionary, not a
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revolutionary process. Some impatient reformers
would want us to scrap the system we have and begin
again. That old cliche, throwing the baby out with the
bathwater, seems to be the only apt description for this
approach, because when you scrap our system in
favour of a laissez-faire approach, you not only free up
the labour market, you also unleash raw industrial
power which can then be exercised quite legitimately in
a free market. You are back to the "rude and barbarous
process of strike and lock-out", and public interest
safeguards become just a memory.

A change in attitudes
1 have argued that conciliation and arbitration,
through the mechanism of centralised wage fixing, has
proved its remarkable adaptability. And I have touched
upon the program of labour market reform currently
underway. I now want to explain how this evolved in
the metal and engineering industry and in doing so
highlight the attitudinal change which has been a
necessary prerequisite for achieving reform.
I mentioned earlier that MTIA members, in secret
ballots, have voted for industry settlements rather than
factory by factory settlements.
They also voted, indeed demanded, that MTIA
change its traditional ways of automatically rejecting
union claims'and being seen to be adopting negative
positions. There was a virtually unanimous view that
MTIA had to adopt positive attitudes - to be seen to be
setting the agenda.
In the adversarial system that exists in Australia for
settling industries disputes, it is easy to take the
traditional employer role and always refuse to concede
that there might be a case for employees to receive a
wage increase.
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It does not require any great intelligence or courage
to simply direct our advocate at Commission hearings
to say no. Employers have done that many times in the
past, and often with very good reason.
But that does not mean that employers must never,
under any circumstances, say yes; it does not mean that
we cannot recognise particular circumstances that
prevail at any given time; that we cannot then look at
that situation entirely on its merits.
An overwhelming majority of MTIA members have
taken the view that the cost of a reasonable wage
increase has to be set against the advantages which will
accrue from restructuring the Metal Industry Award
and establishing an up-to-date training and re-training
system. They look beyond the present and see the
impact of these changes on the productivity and
international competitiveness of their industry, with all
the benefits which will flow on from that across the
Australian economy.
That change in attitude was an essential
precondition for creating the kind of productive culture
advocated in the Seventies by Sir Richard Kirby and
revived by Senator Button in the Eighties.
In the Sixties, when employers and unions were
fighting the absorption and the penal clauses issues,
the relationship between MTIA and the unions was
one of aloofness and mutual suspicion.
At that time of all-out confrontation, when we did
have occasion to meet, it was from well entrenched
positions on both sides - the unions making inflexible
demands and employers giving a flat rejection in reply.
To give effect to the expressed desire of our
members, for MTIA to adopt a pro-active stance, the
Association in 1986 took an initiative with the metal
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trades unions designed to make the industry more
internationally competitive.
We produced a document which we called "MTIA
Proposal For a Compact With The Metal Unions", and
presented it to them in December of that year.
The Compact took as its starting point a shared
concern by employers and unions regarding industry's
viability and future employment prospects.
What the Compact sought to achieve was
harmonious industrial relations based on the mutuality
of interests of management and employees in the
enterprise; the sad fact was, in all those years of
industrial conflict, we had never had the will to
persevere - I'm talking about the whole Australian
community here as well as the metal industry - with
the creation of this kind of industrial relations culture.
The MTIA Compact proposal sought to build upon
that mutual interests foundation to achieve with the
unions:
□ an industry and economic environment which
would encourage investment and profitability;
□ increased disposable income for employees, but
making rises cost-neutral by means of trade-offs;
□ development of the skills and capacities of
individual employees, and increased skill levels and
capacities in the industry as a whole; and overall
□ a much better image for the industry, including a
reputation for quality products and for reliability at
home and overseas.
The Compact made a detailed examination of
16 separate subjects of mutual interest to unions and
employers.
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Forerunner to award restructuring
By March 1987, after an encouraging union
response, we were able to refine the Compact so that it
contained specific and detailed proposals which had
the broad agreement of both parties. These matters
related to:
□ multi-skilling;
□ broadbanding;
□ revision of training programs and techniques;
and
□ discussion on such issues as wage levels, union
coverage, absorption etc.
These and similar proposals have since worked
their way through the union policymaking processes.
Many of the proposals, training and career
development, for example, which the unions have
adopted and which form the basis of the present award
restructuring program, stem from MTIA initiatives in
1986 when we sat down with union officials to establish
a bipartisan approach in the area of training and career
development.
Likewise, a report released by the metal trades
unions and the ACTU in 1987 followed the closely
reasoned MTIA Compact proposals on multi-skilling,
higher trade classifications, wage levels, absorption and
union coverage.
Another important initiative can be found in our
submission to the Hancock Committee, set up to
examine the federal system of industrial regulation.
MTIA proposed that a new object should be added
to Section 2 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act,
requiring the Commission "to pay proper regard to the
effect its awards may have on the ability of import-
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competing and export-oriented industries to remain
internationally competitive".
Later, the ACTU in its policy document, "Australia
Re-constructed" conceded that the wages system
should "pay due regard to price and productivity
movements in the internationally traded goods and
services sector and that "any community standard
should, as far as possible, be set in this sector".
I refer to these developments, not in order to seek
credit for my own Association, but merely to show the
vastly different industrial environment which has
developed as a result of changed attitudes on the part
of employers and unions - changes which Sir Richard
Kirby referred to in prophetic terms back in 1971.
A genuine response from the employers has
produced a like response from the unions. This reflects
great credit on the leadership of the ACTU and the
metal unions. When one considers the long-held
antagonisms of many trade unionists towards
employers and the unaccustomed restraint on the part
of unionists which the new industrial culture has
required, the ACTU has demonstrated leadership
which is highly responsible as well as being
unprecedented. The new relationship between
employers and unions must be nurtured and above all,
not taken for granted, because if circumstances at some
future time made it desirable for the unions to do so,
they could still revert to the use of their industrial
power.

Award restructuring
Without these significant changes in attitudes,
progress in award restructuring would not have been
achieved.
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In the process of changing Australia's industrial
culture, MTIA has been the initiator and at the cutting
edge of award restructuring.
Award restructuring is a deceptively simple title for
complex changes which will have far reaching
consequences in the way workplaces operate, in the
way people are trained, and in the creation of career
paths for occupations which have never enjoyed
planned enhancement of skills and opportunities for
advancement.
Much more is involved than broadbanding and
changing the titles of job classifications - we are seeing
the beginning of a fundamental change in the way
work is performed, the objective being greater labour
flexibility and job satisfaction, higher productivity and
international competitiveness. Changes like these,
which amount to the introduction of a new industrial
culture, require careful planning and gradual
implementation, and a time scale of between three and
five years.
Award restructuring has effectively set the scene for
much greater emphasis to be placed on productivity
improvements negotiated and implemented at the
enterprise level. It preserves all the advantages of
industrial stability which the centralised system can
deliver, while shifting the industrial relations centre of
gravity, as it were, closer to the workplace itself. Award
restructuring has done this by setting out to remove the
road blocks which had become entrenched and
institutionalised in the systems over many decades,
without the removal of which smooth headway could
not be made: an inflexible, outdated system of labour
classification gives way to broadbanding and
multiskilling, allowing employees to perform a wider
range of tasks; a new training system, conducive to
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career path development being developed in
conjunction with TAFE, replaces a narrow training
regimen based on exclusivity and demarcation.
A joint educational approach by the parties to the
award means that managers, supervisors and shop
stewards attend courses designed to facilitate, in a
co-operative environment, implementation of the new
system and with it opportunities for raising
productivity in the enterprise.
The ramifications of award restructuring thus go far
beyond the question of changed work practices. It
marks another stage in the development of our
industrial culture, a broadening of our horizons, so that
we begin to see the big picture: a nation made more
productive, more economically sound because
managements and employees in its enterprises have
the will and the means to achieve their full capabilities.

Towards a better future
I stated earlier that we have made considerable
progress towards implementing our reform agenda.
Of course, we have had to deal with some significant
problems as you might expect when the objective is to
overturn 90 years of an industrial way of life.
Nevertheless, I am optimistic that, with patience
and commonsense, and relying on the trust and
confidence which has built up between organised
employers and organised employees over the past three
years, we will achieve our ambitious goals.
That brings me to what lies ahead and, in this
regard, I want to be reasonably selective and address
two areas that I consider to be critical to our ongoing
program of reform: 1. Union Structures; 2. The Wages
System.
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Trade union structures
It is axiomatic in my view that if we are to achieve
greater labour flexibility, including multi-skilling, we
must rationalise the union structures in our industry.
If current union structures and the accompanying
demarcation lines continue to operate, then the more
flexible job classification system we are putting into
place will simply be a waste of time.
Rationalisation of union structures was high on the
agenda of the recent Biennial Congress of the ACTU
and I believe there is sufficient commitment within the
trade union movement to achieve change. Indeed,
I think most unions accept that in the longer term they
may not survive unless they can accommodate the
needs and aspirations of a workforce whose
composition and attitudes have changed markedly in
the last 50 years. But it is not only the needs of potential
members that will have to be met. The needs of
industry must also be met. Gone are the days when
enterprises can be expected to operate efficiently and
profitably with - taking a real instance - 23 unions
representing 23 sections of the plant's workforce.
I am also reminded of the problems of multiple
unions when I look back over the past 12 months of
negotiating an award restructuring agenda in the metal
and engineering industry and realise how difficult it
was. Not because of the differences between MTIA and
the main union elements but because of the differences
between the unions themselves.
As I have said, the unions have recognised the need
for more rational structures. And amalgamation of
unions is occurring at an increasing rate. For example,
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next year the Amalgamated Metal Workers Union and
the Association of Draughting, Supervisory and
Technical Employees are to merge, as are the Electrical
Trades Union and the Australasian Society of
Engineers. I think the Federated Ironworkers
Association and the Australian Workers Union are still
intending to amalgamate.
While amalgamation is the primary mechanism for
achieving rational union structure, there is also Section
118 of the Industrial Relations Act. This Section
provides that the Commission may make an order to
the effect that although a union might not have
coverage of a group of employees under its Rules, it
may be given coverage to the exclusion of another
union who might have that coverage already. The FIA
has sought to take early advantage of this new
provision but, as you might expect, the unions who are
likely to lose as a result of any order under Section 118
are less than enthusiastic about this device for
achieving rational union structures.
Now, amalgamations and the use of Section 118 are
not exactly "fast-track" procedures. And while they are
vital elements in any successful strategy of labour
market reform, there are other arrangements we should
not overlook and which employers can help to initiate.
For example, in setting up new manufacturing
plants or "greenfield sites" union coverage can be
limited to 2 or 3 unions and, in some cases, to single
union coverage.
Secondly, as an interim measure, it is open to the
unions to meet among themselves and agree on a code
to be adopted where, in the interests of labour
flexibility, members of one union are able to perform
the work traditionally performed by other unions.
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The metal unions have already committed themselves
to this process.
Thirdly, depending on what develops at the
industry level, I think it is open to employers and
unions within an enterprise to come to their own
arrangements to avoid demarcation problems.
The main responsibility for achieving change in this
area lies with the unions themselves, principally
through amalgamations.
But there are opportunities to make immediate
changes by agreement between employers and unions
at the industry and enterprise level. We simply cannot
wait for amalgamations to solve a problem which will
arise tomorrow because the forklift driven by an
ironworker is not allowed to cross the yellow line into
the stores area or because the mechanical fitter cannot
change an electric light globe.

Future wages policy
While award restructuring will take the next three to
five years to implement, this does not mean that there
will be no further wage increases for that period. Any
person or organisation which relies on such a strategy
will be irrelevant in any future debate over wages
policy.
Already, the Australian Council of Trade Unions
(ACTU) has signalled that in May 1990 it will lodge
claims for cost of living adjustments to operate from
September 1990.
Accordingly, employers and their representative
organisations need to be considering now what their
position will be regarding wage policy next year and in
the years immediately following.
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Viable options
The serious and deepseated nature of our economic
problems should rule out the possibility of the
prevailing system of wage fixation being discarded,
at least in the short term.
Assuming it is retained, it must provide for an
orderly process and which produces a macro-wages
outcome which is economically sustainable.
In this context, cost of living adjustments are
unsustainable.
A highly centralised system of that type which
operated between 1983 and 1986 and which focused
almost exclusively on cost of living adjustments
delivered through the mechanism of National Wage
Cases is, in my view, not a system which is appropriate
for Australia in the early 1990s. That view is not shared
by the ACTU, which proposes that wages should be
adjusted for prices in 1990. The ACTU may well have
decided that, with the second tier exercise in 1987 and
the structural efficiency principles in 1988 and 1989, the
union movement has taken restructuring as far as its
constituents will bear at this time: perhaps the unions
feel they need a break from the hard grind of
negotiating restructuring agreements in return for wage
increases.
The fact of the matter is, however, that "manna
from heaven" wage increases granted without
productivity off-sets are a luxury the Australian
economy can no longer afford.
Given the progress we have made over the past
three years towards a more productivity related wages
system, to revert to wage/prices adjustments is not a
viable option for this country.
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The Industrial Relations Commission said in its
August 1989 National Wage decision:
"There is no doubt that labour market reform and in
particular, award wage restraint, have over recent
years contributed positively to the rapid growth in
many sectors of the economy.
". . . it is also apparent that continued efficiencies and
improvements in labour flexibility as well as ongoing
wage restraint will remain necessary".
We have to find a wages system which offers a
balanced approach to the competing needs of
controlling the macro-wages outcome and the need to
maintain the momentum of labour market reform over
the next two to three critical years.
I believe we need to retain the centralised approach
to set a ceiling on wage increases but provide the
opportunity to industries or enterprises to negotiate
wage increases to the maximum amount available with
the objective of improving the productivity and
efficiency of the industry or enterprise. I think the
emphasis, however, should be on the enterprise. More
than likely there could be room for a combination
of both.
There will be those in the union movement in
particular who throw up their hands in horror at this
approach because it will remind them of the 1987 two
tier approach to wage fixing. The two tier approach
relied too heavily on a narrow agenda largely directed
at removing restrictive work practices and has been
criticised for its negative, cost-cutting approach.
We have to be far more innovative next time around
and perhaps there are some lessons to be learned from
other countries in this regard. But in no circumstances
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can Australia afford to revert to cost of living wage
adjustments.

Wages conference proposal
As we look towards the next stage in the evolution
of industrial relations, employers need to begin now to
stake out their wage policy positions.
In the past, employers have allowed the ACTU to
build up expectations about a wages outcome months
in advance of it being considered by the Industrial
Relations Commission, and as a result it becomes selffulfilling. Once again, we see the ACTU creating early
expectations, attempting to set the agenda, by
signalling that its wages policy in 1990 will be based on
cost of living movements. It is therefore critical that
employers begin the process of formulating a realistic,
innovative wage policy which attracts widespread
public support.
But this will not be enough. The traditional
approach to fixing national wages has been that the
ACTU files a claim for a wage increase on behalf of its
affiliates and the adversarial process of long-winded,
often irrelevant debate begins. Parties are locked into
advocating a particular policy from day one with little
opportunity for sensible compromise or negotiation
later in the proceedings.
If as employers we are serious in wanting a more
flexible wages policy, which will maintain the
momentum of labour market reform, then we cannot
afford to leave matters until the commencement of the
next National Wage Case, by which time the agenda
will essentially have been determined. What we need is
a Wages Conference well before May next year to
enable an exchange of views on wages policy and,
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hopefully, reach some consensus on such a policy. The
Conference would necessarily involve the Australian
Industrial Relations Commission, the Commonwealth
Government, State Governments, major employer
bodies, the ACTU, and representatives from State
industrial tribunals. Employers must be prepared to be
more honest, and lay their cards on the table. The
extent to which employer organisations are able to meet
this challenge will be a mark of their maturity or
otherwise.
Over the next few months, in addition to the
massive task of implementing award restructuring,
MTIA will be considering its own policy on wages in
the light of: progress in award restructuring; the
ongoing cost impact over the next two years arising out
of the last National Wage Case decision; economic
forecasts; and our members' expectations of future
business conditions. An assessment of these factors
may demand that any potential wage increases over the
next two years be substantially discounted. But in the
course of our deliberations we will be looking at how
we can make a positive and constructive contribution to
national wage policy.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the short answer to the proposition
posed in the title of my paper is: yes, Australia has
demonstrated in 1989 that it is capable of making great
progress in adapting industrial relations attitudes and
institutions to meet the over-riding public interest - in
this case the need to overcome the nation's chronic
economic problems. To that extent, who can say that a
new province of law and order is not slowly and
imperceptibly taking shape around us? If that is so -
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Appendix 1 - ballot paper June 1988
______ Wages and Award Restructuring
and I believe it is - it owes its development and its
continued survival to the willingness of those
concerned:
□ to learn the lessons of history
□ and to apply that knowledge in good conscience
and in a spirit of fair dealing.
As Australians, we are the custodians as well as the
beneficiaries of a unique but still imperfect system of
industrial law and order; it is incumbent upon each
generation to leave it in better shape than we found it.
As Sir Richard Kirby has said, it " . . goes beyond
the interest of one side or another seeking to get the
most out of a situation for individual advantage it goes right to the heart of the nation's interest".

Having heard a report on claims by the metal trades

unions for wage increases and the background to
those claims, this meeting:1
Confirms that the priority for both employers and
employees in the metal and engineering industry must be
the maintenance of the industry's future viability. This will
depend to a very large extent on there being a quantum
leap in the industry's productivity and productive culture
and that MTIA's proposals for an agreement with the
M TFU on award restructuring, more flexible utilisation of
labour and the introduction of career paths provides a
sound basis for achieving this;
|~2~| Em phasises the importance of a moderate wages
outcome in 1988/89;

O

: 3^

Notes that in the Economic Statem ent delivered by
the Treasurer on 25 May 1988, he said that:
"Our overriding objective m ust also be to keep
w ages grow th as close a s p ossib le to our
tr a d in g p a r tn e r s so th a t we rem a in
com petitive on w orld m arkets.
A fter the h a rd work an d sacrifice o f recent
years, an d with inflation now h ead in g
tow ards 5 p er cent or lower, th is objective is
consistent with the overall m ain ten an ce o f
real w ages in 1988-89."

4^ N o tes f u r th e r th a t th e C om m onw ealth
Government's policy in the forthcoming National Wage
Case is that it will be advocating that real wages should be
maintained in 1988-89 and that any wage increase should
be introduced in two stages.
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Appendix 1 (continued)

Having reg ard to the foregoing this
m eeting has formed the view that:Q
The National Executive of MTIA
should authorise a submission to the
National Wage Case which reiterates the
Association's existing policy i.e., that the
package o f tra in in g and award
restructuring measures referred to in
MTIA's proposals for an agreement with
the MTFU are designed to lift productivity
at both the industry and enterprise level.
However, the amount and timing of any
wage increase justified by this package
shall be a matter to be determined by the
Australian Conciliation and Arbitration
Commission in accordance with any
principles which may apply following the
review of the existing wage fixing
principles.
OR
0
The National Executive of MTIA
should authorise a positive submission
which:a) em ph asises
the
overriding
importance to the industry of the award
restructuring exercise which is designed
to improve the industry's productivity and
productive culture
b) acknow ledges th a t it is the
Commonwealth Government's objective
to maintain the level of real v/ages in 1988/
89, consistent with an inflation rate of 5
per cent or lower;
c) maintains the position that the
amount and timing of any wage increase
justified by the proposed agreement
between MTIA and the MTFU relating to
award restructuring, more flexible
utilisation of labour and training and
career development should be determined
in the National Wage Case;

Appendix 2 - ballot paper February 1989

El

The National Executive of MTIA
should authorise a submission in the
National Wage Case to the effect that the
package of measures contained in MTIA's
proposals for an agreement with the
MTFU on award restructuring, training
and career paths, together with the
Commonwealth's support for a wage
increase, provide grounds for wages to be
adjusted in two stages in 1988/89 on
terms to be decided in the National Wage
Case;
OR

□
The National Executive of MTIA
should authorise the taking of all steps
which are reasonably open to MTIA and
which are achievable, to have the matter
resolved on terms acceptable to both the
Commonwealth Government and the
Arbitration Commission and which are
consistent with the Commonwealth’s
wages policy and MTIA's strategy for
award restructuring, training and career
development.
OR
0
Any other course of action that
members consider appropriate.
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Wages and Award Restructuring
Having heard a Full Report on MTIA’s Award Restructuring
Proposals and having considered the factors influencing wage levels
and industrial relations in 1989-90, this meeting has formed the
view th a t:1 1 1 The National Executive of MTIA should authorise a sub
mission to the May 1989 National Wage Case which reiterates the
Association’s existing policy on wages. This means that there should
be no general wage increases in the 1989-90 financial year. Any
wage increases should only become payable once an individual
employee puts to use the new skills acquired under the restructured
award. Furthermore, the maximum amounts of any wage increases
justified under MTIA’s proposals should be determined by the
National Wage Case.
OR

3 J The National Executive of MTIA should authorise a sub
m ission in th e May 1989 N atio n al Wage C ase as follow s:
Implementation of the package of measures contained in MTIA’s
restructuring proposals, or im plementation of any agreem ent
substantially based on those proposals, provide grounds for wages
to be adjusted across the board in two stages in 1989-90 on terms
to be decided in the National Wage Case.
OR
3
The National Executive of MTIA should authorise the taking
of all steps which are reasonably open to MTIA to achieve an
agreem ent with the Metal Trades Unions and the ACTU on wages
and aw ard re stru ctu rin g on term s a c c e p ta b le to both th e
Commonwealt h Government and the Arbitration Commission and
which are consistent with MTIA’s proposals for award restructuring,
training and career development.
OR
4
Any o th e r co u rse o f a ctio n th a t m em bers co n sid er
appropriate.
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